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NOTES AND COMMENT
CONDITIONS IN RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE.
Modem distinctions between valid and invalid conditions in re-
straint of marriage are deeply rooted in 'he past, and are the result
of the development of the particular spheres of jurisdiction of the
several courts. The English ecclesiastical courts, which originally
had jurisdiction over the payment of all legacies arising out of per-
sonal property,1 adopted the doctrine of the Roman civil law, which
declared absolutely void all conditions in wills restraining marriage,
whether those conditions were in partial restraint or whether they
were in total restraint.2 Following the Reformation, the power of
the ecclesiastical courts was gradually taken away, and in 1857 their
jurisdiction in testamentary and probate matters was transferred to
newly created civil courts.3 However, much of the law of probate
and administration of estates, as dispensed by the secular courts, was
based upon principles settled by the ecclesiastical courts when they
had authority over these matters. Matters involving real property
(and consequently devises of real property), on the other hand, were
traditionally under the jurisdiction of the common law courts, and
the common law recognized the validity of conditions involving rea-
sonable restraints on marriage.4 In an attempt to reconcile these
conflicting theories, the courts of equity, which eventually gained
jurisdiction over all legacies, developed numerous and complex dis-
tinctions on the subject.5 As a result, even in this country, the law
in regard to conditions in restraint of marriage was, until recently,
controlled by many curious and subtle refinements respecting real and
personal property, conditions and limitations, conditions precedent and
conditions subsequent, gifts with and without valid limitation over,
and the application of the rule to widows and other persons. Statu-
tory changes in New York have made most of these distinctions
merely academic.
Public Policy.
The fundamental concept underlying this branch of the law is
that modem society is built about the home, and its perpetuation is
essential to the welfare of the community. Obviously, the state has an
1 1 BOWMAN, HANDBOOK OF ELEMENTARY LAW 201.
2 Whiting v. De Rutzen, L. R. (1905), 1 Ch. Div. 96, 101 ("The origin of
the rule against restrictions on marriage was the tendency of the canon law, in
the interests of morality, to favor marriage."); Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves.
Jr. 89, 30 Eng. Rep. 909, 912 (1796).
3 BOWMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 202.
4 Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. Jr. 89. 30 Eng. Rep. 909 (1796).
5 Hughes v. Conlan, 225 App. Div. 29, 232 N. Y. Supp. 84 (4th Dept.
1928); Mann v. Jackson, 84 Me. 400, 402, 24 Atl. 886, 887 (1892).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
interest in the marriage institution as such,6 and its policy is to encour-
age matrimony and discourage celibacy and illicit relations. "The
family is the ultimate foundation upon which the soundness of the
structure of the State depends." 7 Therefore, the state will not, in
general, allow parties by contract,8 deed,9 or by a condition in a will,
to make the continuance of an estate depend on the owner not doing
that which it is, or may be, in the interest of the state that he should
do.'0 Public policy is concerned with future conduct, and, therefore,
it is not concerned with bequests which might be deemed a reward for
past evil conduct, but is concerned with bequests which may influence
future conduct.11 Partial restraints have been sustained because they
tend to prevent hasty and imprudent marriages 12 and to safeguard
the welfare of the beneficiary.' 3  Conditions in regard to remarriage
were not considered as total restraints of marriage, but merely as par-
tial restraint as the person involved had been married at least once.14
It may be seen, therefore, that considerations of public policy may
8 Merriam v. Wolcott, 61 How. Pr. 377, 383 (N. Y. 1881); Matter of
Seaman, 218 N. Y. 77, 81, 112 N. E. 576, 578 (1916); Matter of Forte, 149
Misc. 329, 330, 267 N. Y. Supp. 603, 606 (1933) ("The almost innumerable
applications of this basic concept in the laws of every civilized community will
be obvious upon a moment's reflection, involving as they do, the establishment
and maintenance of a family unit, the support of the wife and children by the
husband, the care and training of the children by the parents, the obligations of
filial regard and obedience, and the protection of the home against injurious
alien intrusion. In all these and many other elements which must be necessary
contributing factors to the maintenance of successful and happy homes and the
training and development of the youth which must be the bone and sinew of the
State in the days to come, the community and nation possess a vital interest") ;
Whiting v. De Rutzen, L. R. (1905), 1 Ch. Div. 96; THOMPSON, LAW OF
WILLS (1923) 647.
7 People v. Olmstead, 27 Barb. 9, 33 (N. Y. 1857) ; Matter of Forte, 149
Misc. 327, 328, 267 N. Y. Supp. 603, 606 (1933).
8 Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225, 98 Eng. Rep. 160 (1768); Conrad v. Wil-
liams, 6 Hill 444 (N. Y. 1844).
9 Randall v. Marble, 69 Me. 310 (1879); Monroe v. Hall, 97 N. C. 206,
1 S. E. 651 (1887) ; Gard v. Mason, 169 N. C. 507, 86 S. E. 302 (1915).
10 Whiting v. De Rutzen, L. R. (1905) 1 Ch. Div. 96, 114.
"Matter of Liberman, 279 N. Y. 458, 464 (1939).
12 Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 164, 171 (1882); Pachholder v. Rosenheim,
129 Md. 455, 99 Atl. 672, 674 (1916); Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. Jr. 89,
30 Eng. Rep. 909 (Ch. 1796).
"3 Matter of Seaman, 218 N. Y. 77, 83, 112 N. E. 576, 578 (1916) ("It is the
duty of the courts, said the Chancellor, 'to favor * * * any * * * legal means
which a father may adopt to enforce the authority which the law, for wise pur-
poses, has given to him over his minor children and that regard for his wishes
and counsel in the more important concerns of their lives after maturity, which
the untrammelled testamentary power conferred by our law, is calculated to
secure'").
14 In. re Mortem's Estate, 130 Misc. 34, 224 N. Y. Supp. 75 (1927); In re
Hotz, 38 Pa. 422 (1861) ; Overton v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S. W. 250 (1902);
Herd v. Catron, 97 Tenn. 662, 37 S. W. 551 (1896) ; cf. Hoopes v. Dundas, 10
Pa. 75 (1848). Contra: Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266 (1883); Van




often conflict with the desire of the courts to protect the owner of
property in disposing of it under such lawful limitations and conditions
as he may subscribe.15
Two principles, so basic as to be almost elementary, permeate
this branch of the law: one, is that all conditions in total restraint of
marriage, whether attached to personalty or real property, are void
absolutely; and two, that reasonable 'conditions in partial restraint may
be valid.16 The questions whether a condition is in partial or. total
restraint, or whether it is reasonable, are, in themselves, rather
simple.17 The bona fide intent of the testator constituted an impor-
tant factor in the determination of those questions.' 8 But the serious
problems arose as to the effect to be given to the invalid conditions,
and as to the effect which was to be given to the conditions in partial
restraint.
Conditions Annexed to Real Property.
Formerly, it was necessary to draw a primary distinction between
a devise of, or charge upon real property, and a legacy of personal
property.19 Restrictions in devises of real property presented but
little difficulty. The English courts, in deciding cases arising out of
25 Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 164, 171 (1882).
16 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1839) § 280 ("The general result
of the modem English doctrine on this subject (for it will not be easy to
reconcile the cases) may be stated in the following summary manner. Conditions
annexed to gifts, legacies and devises in restraint of marriage are not void, if
they are reasonable in themselves and do not directly or virtually operate as an
undue restraint upon the freedom of marriage. If the condition is in restraint of
marriage generally, then indeed, as a condition against the public policy and
the due 'economy and morality of domestic life', it will be void").
17 Courts have sustained the validity of condition which restrained marriage
as to specified persons, Matter of Seaman's Will, 218 N. Y. 77, 112 N. E. 576
(1916), a condition which restrained marriage as to a certain family, Philips
v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 509, 8 S. E. 241 (1881), a condition against marriage with-
out the consent of those interested in the devisee's welfare, Onderdonk v.
Onderdonk, 127 N. Y. 196, 22 N. E. 839 (1891), a condition against marriage
until a certain age (as twenty-one), Bayeaux v. Bayeaux, 8 Paige 332 (N. Y.
1840), a condition against marriage with a member of a named religious group,
Hodgson v. Halford, 11 Ch. Div. 959 (1878).
Courts have declared void a condition that daughter remain single, Matter
of Denfield, 156 Mass. 265, 30 N. E. 1018 (1892), a condition that daughter
inherit only if she be separate and apart from her husband, Matter of Hutchins,
147 Misc. 462, 263 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1933), a condition which gave the entire
estate to a son when and if he divorced from his wife. Matter of Haight, 51
App. Div. 310, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1029 (2d Dept. 1900).
18 Whiting v. De Rutzen, L. R. (1905) 1 Ch. Div. 96, 112 ("If instead
of creating a condition absolutely enjoining celibacy or widowhood, the same be
referred to the advice or discretion of another, particularly an interested person,
it is deemed a fraud on the law and treated accordingly; that is the condition
so imposed is holden for void."). SCHOULER, LAW OF WILLS (6th ed. 1923)
1506.
'9 Mann v. Jackson, 84 Me. 400, 402, 24 Atl. 886, 887 (1892); JARMAN,
TREATISE ON WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 1496, 1497.
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devises of land, followed the common law, and, consequently, any
conditions in such devises were strictly construed. 20  If a condition
precedent was void as being in general restraint of marriage, the devise
itself was void; if the void condition was subsequent, the devise was
absolute.21  If the condition was such that marriage was only par-
tially restrained as to time, place or person and what was reasonable,
it was good. Such a condition did not require a gift over to make it
valid.22  This principle is said to be based on the rule that if there
was a breach of condition, the heir-at-law of the testator could enter
and, therefore, the necessity for a gift over was non-existent. Under
a devise to A of land, upon condition that A marries with the consent
of X, the condition is precedent, and A takes nothing unless he mar-
ries in accordance with the condition. 23  If land is devised to A,
subject to a condition that he shall not marry without the consent of
X, the condition is subsequent, and if he marries without the required
consent, his estate is divested. 24
However, it was very often difficult to decide whether a condition
was precedent or subsequent.25  No technical words indicating the
difference between conditions precedent and subsequent were recog-
nized, 26 and the question was regarded as one of intention. It was
considered sufficient to make the condition subsequent if it appeared
20 Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. Jr. 89, 92, 30 Eng. Rep. 909, 911 (1796).
21 Scott v. Tyler, 2 Bro. Ch. 432, 29 Eng. Rep. 241 (Ch. 1788) ; JARAN,
TREATISE ON WILLs (7th ed. 1930) 1443.
22 Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 164, 174 (1882) ("In the latter cases (touch-
ing real estate) the doctrine of the common law in respect to conditions is
strictly applied. If the condition is precedent, it must be strictly complied with
in order to entitle the party to the benefit of the devise or gift. If the condition
be subsequent, its validity will depend upon its being such as the law will allow
to divest an estate.") ; JARMAN, TREATISE ON WiLLs (7th ed. 1930) 1499.
23 Merriam v. Wolcott, 61 How. Pr. 377, 383 (N. Y. 1881); Harvey v.
Aston, 1 Atk. 361, 26 Eng. Rep. 228 (Ch. 1737); Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk.
330, 26 Eng. Rep. 991 (Ch. 1746).
24 Fry v. Porter, 1 Mod. 300, 86 Eng. Rep. 898 (K. B. 1809).
25 Peyton v. Bury, 2 P. Wins. 626, 24 Eng. Rep. 889 (Ch. 1731) (The
testator bequeathed the residue of his personal estate to S, provided she married
with the consent of A and B, his executors in trust, and if she should marry
otherwise, he bequeathed the said residuum to W. A died; after which S married
without the consent of B. The court observed it was very clear that, in the
nature of the thing and according to the intention of the testator, this could
not be a condition precedent; for, at that rate, the right to the residue might
not have vested in any person whatever for twenty or thirty years after the
testator's death, since both of the executors might have lived, and S have
continued so long unmarried, during all which time the right to the residue
could not be (beneficially) in the executors, they being expressly mentioned to
be but executors in trust. In this case, it was observed, the bequest over showed
that the testator meant to make marriage without consent a forfeiture. The
case seems to be analogous in principle to those in which a devise or bequest,
if the object shall attain a certain age, with a gift over in case he shall die
under that age, has been held to be immediately vested).
26 Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, 242, 28 N. E. 238, 241 (1891).
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from the context of his will that the testator intended an immediate
interest to pass to the object of his bounty.2 7
Conditions Annexed to Personal Property.
Gifts charged on personalty were originally within the jurisdic-
tion of the ecclesiastical courts. Therefore, the civil law, which was
opposed to all conditions in restraint, was applicable to them. In
regard to conditions precedent the civil law differed in some respects
from the common law; the rule of the civil law being "that where a
condition precedent is originally impossible, or is illegal as involving
nwalum prohibitum, the bequest is absolute just as if the condition had
been subsequent. But where the performance of the condition is the
sole motive of the bequest, or its impossibility was unknown to the
testator, or the condition which was possible in its creation has since
become impossible by the act of God or where it is illegal as involving
nwlur in se, in these cases the civil agrees with the common law in
holding both gift and condition void." 25 Practically all conditions in
restraint of marriage were considered as nalum prohibitum, and,
consequently, were accorded this liberal construction.
Conditions annexed to gifts of personal property had, as a general
rule, to be accompanied by a gift over, otherwise the condition was
regarded as in terrorem and inoperative.2 9 The distinction made in
cases where there was an express devise over does not seem to be
founded upon any principle and may possibly have grown out of an
effort to partially restore the harmony of the law.30 It would seem
that if the condition was legal, it ought to be given effect, as no gift
over would make an illegal condition effectual. 31 Several reasons
have been given for the rule requiring a gift over. One is that the
gift over manifests the intention of the testator not to make the dec-
laration of forfeiture merely in terrorem; 32 the other, that the interest
of the legatee over is the distinguishing feature, and the clause became
27 O'Brien v. Barkley, 78 Hun 609, 28 N. Y. Supp. 1049, 1052 (3d Dept.
1894) ("Whether the condition is precedent or subsequent depends on the order
of the time in which performance is required").
28 Dusbiber v. Melville, 178 Mich. 601, 146 N. W. 208 (1914); JARMAN,
TRATISE ON WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 1444.
29 Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 164 (1882) ; Bostich v. Blades, 59 Md. 231
(1882); Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266 (1883); Gough v. Manning, 26
Md. 347 (1867); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810) ; Reynish v. Martin,
3 Atk. 330, 26 Eng. Rep. 991 (Ch. 1746); Whaler v. Bingham, 3 Atk. 364,
26 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ch. 1746) ; Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. Jr. 89, 30 Eng.
Rep. 909 (Ch. 1796) ; Whiting v. De Rutzen, L. R. (1905) 1 Ch. Div. 96.
30 Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 164, 193 (1882).
3' Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. Jr. 89, 30 Eng. Rep. 909, 913 (Ch. 1796)
("I do not see the great importance of the distinction upon a bequest over of
the legacy. It is one of the points that occurred to judges sitting here to deliver
them from the difficulty arising from the rule of the civil law, adopted without
seeing the ground and the reason of applying it to this country under different
circumstances").
32 Whiting v. De Rutzen, L. R. (1905) 1 Ch. Div. 96, 101.
1939 ]
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a conditional limitation to which the courts were bound to give effect.3 3
This rule was absolutely fixed only as to conditions subsequent.
3 4
The law as to conditions precedent without a gift over, was rather
unsettled. However, the rule may be stated thus: A condition prece-
dent without a gift over was considered merely in terrorem except
where the legatee took a provision or legacy.in the alternative (the
smallness of the alternative legacy made no difference) ,5 or where the
condition concerning marriage was only one of two, on either of which
the legatee would be entitled to the legacy,3 6 or where marriage with
consent was confined to minority.3 7 The courts did not consider that
a residuary bequest amounted to a gift over.38 Thus it may be seen
that a valid condition expressing a legitimate desire of the testator
could be defeated in its practical effect by a mere technicality. This
resulted in the absurdity of having a court declare a condition valid
and at the same time deny it effect.
In the event that a gift arose partially out of personal property,
and partially out of real prfperty, so far as it was payable out of each
species, it was governed by the rule applicable to that species.3
9 It
can be easily seen what extraordinary complications might arise
through such a bequest.
Limitations.
There is apparent in the later decisions, an anxiety on the part of
the judges to limit the rule adopted from the civil law.40  A testa-
mentary disposition, although it appeared in a form which was capable
of being construed as a condition, was construed, nevertheless, as a
limitation if that appeared to have been the testator's intention. Thus,
where a testator bequeathed a life interest in certain property to a
single woman with a provision for its termination in the event of her
marrying, the provision was construed as showing an intention to
provide for her while she was unmarried and not as a condition in
restraint of marriage.41 A testator using the phraseology of a limita-
33 JARMAN, TREATISE ON WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 1503.
34 Scott v. Tyler, 2 Bro. Ch. 432, 29 Eng. Rep. 241 (Ch. 1788) ; Dashwood
v. Lord Bulkeley, 10 Ves. 230, 32 Eng. Rep. 832 (Ch. 1804).
35 Creagh v. Wilson, 2 Vern. 522, 23 Eng. Rep. 972 (Ch. 1706) ; Gillet v.
Wray, P. Wins. 284, 24 Eng. Rep. 390 (Ch. 1715).
36 Hemings v. Munckley, 1 Cox 39, 29 Eng. Rep. 1052 (Ch. 1783).
37 JARMAN, TREATISE ON WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 1503.
38 Wheeler v. Bingham, 3 Atk. 364, 26 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1746); Lloyd v.
Branton, 3 Mer. 118, 36 Eng. Rep. 42 (1817).
39 JARMAN, TREATISE ON WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 1503.
40 Matter of Seaman, 218 N. Y. 77, 83, 112 N. E. 576, 578 (1916) ("Where
it is possible that the condition may be legally performed, it will not be pre-
sumed that the testator intended an illegal performance. * * * The legal pre-
sumption is that men do not commit criminal offences.").
41 Heath v. Lewes, 3 De G. M. & G. 954, 43 Eng. Rep. 374 (Ch. 1853);
In re Moore, L. R. (1888) 39 Ch. Div. 116.
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tion 42 could obtain the practical effect of a restraint on marriage.
The distinction between a provision granting a devisee an estate "until
she marry", and a provision that the estate is granted "on condition
she remain unmarried" is shadowy. The ultimate result is the same
-upon marriage the estate ends. Nor can it be said that the tempta-
tion to refrain from marriage is greater in the one instance than in
the other.
Criticism.
The law in regard to conditions in restraint of marriage was
severely criticized by many eminent jurists.43  "This branch of the
law is one with which it is not very satisfactory to deal, and I cannot
say that I think the mode in which it has been dealt with is very easy
to weld into one consistent whole." 44 Yet the courts felt constrained
to follow decisions which had become so firmly engrafted on the
system as to become an integral part thereof.45  Unsatisfactory as
42 i re Horton's Will, 160 Misc. 64, 289 N. Y. Supp. 618 (1936) (Gift
to a daughter as long as she remain unmarried, held to be a valid limitation and
not a provision in restraint of marriage); Maddox v. Yoe, 121 Md. 288, 88
AtI. 225 (1913) (A devise or bequest to a woman of an estate so long as she
remain single and unmarried is valid, and does not operate as a condition in
restraint of marriage) ; Harlow v. Bailey, 189 Mass. 208, 75 N. E. 259 (1905)(A devise to one "so long as shall remain unmarried" is not invalid as in
restraint of marriage, though the devisee may be induced to remain single to
enjoy the benefits of the devise); Trenton Trust Co. v. Armstrong, 70 N. J.
572, 62 Atl. 456 (1905) (A gift intending to provide for the legatee while single
may contain a valid condition against marriage. Thus a provision in a will for
support of daughters so long as they continue unmarried and need support is a
valid provision and not in restraint of marriage); 1It re Bruch's Estate, 185
Pa. St. 194, 39 AtI. 813 (1898) (A bequest of income of a certain sum to a
person so long as she remain single and bear her then name, is not in restraint
of marriage, but merely on a limitation as to time) ; It re Holbrook's Estate,
213 Pa. 93, 62 At. 368 (1905) (Testator by his will gave the income of a fund
during the beneficiary's life or so long as she remained unmarried, with a gift
over in case of her death or marriage. It was held that though the gift was
upon a limitation in favor of the beneficiary while she remained unmarried, it
was not invalid as an unlawful restraint of marriage).
43 Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. Jr. 89, 30 Eng. Rep. 909, 912 (1796) ("It
is impossib le to reconcile the authorities or range them under one sensible,
plain general rule. There can be no ground in the construction of legacies for
a distinction between legacies out of personal and out of real estate. The con-
struction ought to be precisely the same. I do not see more importance in
reality in the distinction between conditions precedent and subsequent. * * *
there was a blind superstitious adherence to the text of the civil law. They
never reasoned; but only looked into the books, and transferred the rule, without
weighing the circumstances, as positive rules to guide them. It is beyond imagi-
nation except from that circumstance, how in a Christian country they should
have adopted the rule of the Roman law with regard to conditions as to
marriage").
44 Whiting v. De Rutzen, L. R. (1905) 1 Ch. Div. 96, 116.
45 Id. at 117 ("But in my opinion, we are not really in a position to deal
with such matters according to our view of what might or might not be desir-
able for the community. I think we are bound to follow the decisions of Lord
1939 ]
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were the results obtained under this system, the courts of New York
were not liberated from the necessity of applying it until rather
recently. Even then, liberation came from without, and not from
within.
Recent Modifications.
Statutory changes within the last decade have wrought important
modifications of the old rules concerning these conditions. Under
Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law,46 a widow now has the right
to elect against a will which provides that a trust or legacy is made on
condition that she does not remarry. Where, therefore, the common
law held that such conditions were valid and enforcible, the statute
now gives the widow an opportunity to defeat such a condition with-
out declaring such conditions invalid expressly or impliedly. 47 Im-
portant as this statute may be in its operation in individual instances,
its importance, when compared with another statutory change, is
trivial. In 1930, Section 81 of Decedent Estate Law 48 took effect.
This statute abolished the distinction between personal and real prop-
.erty for testamentary purposes.40  Consequently, the fact that a con-
dition has been attached to a devise of real property, rather than to a
gift of personal property, will no longer have any effect on the ultimate
outcome.50 As a secondary result, the fact that the testator has or
has not provided for a valid gift over will no longer operate to defeat
a valid condition. Therefore, the conflicting results of the old rule
will no longer be possible. It is now only necessary to determine
whether the condition is contrary to the public policy of the state,
whether the condition is reasonable, whether the condition is precedent
or subsequent, and the effect that is to be given to that condition. In
a recent case,5 ' the Court of Appeals was confronted with a will, the
terms of which afforded the court an excellent opportunity to exercise
its new freedom. The testator had two sons and a daughter. 'The
younger son had twice been married to women of a different faith, and
the testator had strongly disapproved. By the terms of the will, the
residuary estate vested in the other two children, subject to being
Eldon in Dashwood v. Lord Bulkeley, 10 Ves. 230 and Sir William Grant in
Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Mer. 108, 17 R. R. 33").
46 N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 18.
47 Matter of Byrnes, 260 N. Y. 465, 184 N. E. 56 (1933), motion for reargu-
inent denied, 261 N. Y. 623, 185 N. E. 765 (1933).
48 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 81.
49 N. Y. DEc. EST. LAW § 81: "All existing modes, rules and canons of
descent are hereby abolished. * * * All distinctions between the persons who
take as heirs at law or next of kin are abolished and the descent of real prop-
erty and the distribution of personal property shall be governed by this article
except as otherwise specifically provided by law. * * *."
50 ln re Wainrights's Will, 157 Misc. 531, 284 N. Y. Supp. 578 (1935),
rev'd on other grounds, 248 App. Div. 336, 289 N. Y. Supp. 510 (2d Dept.
1936).
5" Matter of Liberman, '279 N. Y. 458 (1939).
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divested if the younger son married with the consent of his sister and
brother. The intent of the testator was to prevent his son from
marrying any but a Jewess. The court said: "We decide in
this case only whether the condition in the present case is rea-
sonable and does not contravene our public policy, and we may
not ignore any of those factors which determine either the pur-
pose or the extent of the restraint." 52 The fact that the restraint
was imposed upon an adult, forty years of age, combined with
the fact that there was no limitation as to time and that the
very persons whose consent was required would benefit by the
withholding of their consent,53 made the condition invalid and in-
consistent with public policy, the natural tendency of such a condi-
tion being to restrain all marriage. The court asserted: "Whether a
condition in restraint of marriage is reasonable depends, not upon the
form of the condition, but upon its purpose and effect under the cir-
cumstances. What has been said and decided in other cases may
often guide in analogous cases; but no rigid rule based upon ancient
precedents dictates a decision where the circumstances are different
and reason points to another conclusion." (Italics ours.) In de-
ciding what effect was to be given to the invalid condition precedent,
the court turned its back upon the strict rules of the common law and
adopted the rule that where a void condition is merely malum prohibi-
turn, the beneficiary takes as if no condition had been annexed to the
gift or as if he had complied with the void condition. "We recognize
that it [the above rule] is rooted in considerations of practical expe-
diency or necessity rather than logic. To give the rule less force:
to declare the condition void without at the same time giving effect to
the gift made upon the void condition, would be a mockery of the
beneficiary and by indirection would permit a testator to accomplish a
result which we hold contrary to the 'common weal'." 55 While the
court was setting a precedent within its own jurisdiction,5" it was
not without precedents in jurisdictions outside of New York.57
52 Id. at 466.
G3 Bayeaux v. Bayeaux, 8 Paige 332, 333 (N. Y. 1840) ("He also appears
to have had some confused idea of a power in trust to take the property from
the children and give it to others, in case of disobedience or upon their marry-
ing without the consent of their mother. But, even that power is not given in
such a way that it can be effectually exercised; as the mother is not authorized
to appoint the property to others in such a case. And a power to keep the
property herself, by withholding her assent to the marriage of her child, would
probably be invalid and inconsistent with the principles of public policy; as it
might operate as an inducement to her to withhold her consent to a proper
marriage").
54 Matter of Liberman, 279 N. Y. 458, 465 (1939).
L Id. at 469.
56 The Appellate Division, in Matter of Haight, 51 App. Div. 310, 64 N. Y.
Supp. 1029 (2d Dept. 1900), adopted the rule, but the question never before
directly presented itself to the Court of Appeals.
7 Brizendine v. American Trust and Savings Bank, 211 Ala. 694, 101 So.
618 (1924).
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In any question arising from a condition in restraint of marriage,
there is a balancing of two opposing interests-the desire of the courts
to give effect to the testator's wishes as expressed in his will, and~the
desire of the courts to uphold the public policy of the state. In view
of the onslaughts made on the common law doctrine in regard to these
conditions by both the legislature and the courts, the intention of the
testator has been reduced to a secondary position. The courts, freed
from the necessity of giving lip-service to outmoded and antiquated
legalisms, have torn aside the veil of technicalities and regarded the
problem afresh. If, in the final analysis, the condition is one which
tends to restrain all marriage, or is unreasonable, the testator will not
be permitted, by the use of technical language, to indirectly achieve
the result which he could not achieve directly. Nor can it be doubted
that it is better, in the long run, to sacrifice the intentions of individual
testators to the interests of uniformity and public policy.
ROSE M. TRAPANI.
"END" OF A WILL IN NEW YORK.
Miss Emma, a spinster, wishes to make a will. She buys a
blank will form from her corner stationery store, and, being satisfied
that the printed matter is in nice, technical, legal language, she starts
to fill it out in her own handwriting. This will form consists of one
sheet of paper, so folded on the left as to make four pages. The for-
mal opening is on the first page, and the formal termination is on
the second page, leaving the third and fourth pages blank. There is
a blank space of a few inches on the first page for the dispositive
provisions of her will. But there is not enough room for all the be-
quests she wishes to make. And seeing there is no space above the
formal termination on the second page, Miss Emma continues and
concludes her bequests on the third page, still in her own handwriting.
In thus carrying over from the first to the third page, she has fol-
lowed the method employed by many people in writing informal let-
ters. She then calls in two of her neighbors, declares to them that
the document is her will, signs her name in the proper place on the
second page, and asks them to subscribe their names below the attes-
tation clause, which they do. Miss Emma dies a short time later,
and the will is presented to the surrogate for probate. Should the
surrogate admit the will to probate?'
It is easy enough to say that she should have sought the advice
of her attorney, but she no longer is in a position to remedy her mis-
1 These are substantially the facts in Matter of Golden, 165 Misc. 205,
300 N. Y. Supp. 737 (1937), aff'd, 253 App. Div. 919, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 886(2d Dept. 1938). In that case, it was held that the will was subscribed at the
literary end and, therefore, entitled to probate.
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